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Abstract. Throughout history, market arrangements are necessary institutions in historical 
context.  Greenspan and Woodridge provide a scholarly narrative for US economic history 
against the backdrop of creative destruction, irrational exuberance, and secular stagnation to 
evaluate periods when markets became more prominent and policies that made them less 
so.  
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Book review  
arl Marx’s Theory of History emphasizes feudalism’s transition 
into capitalism—in turn—which transitions into socialism.  His 
materialist dialectic is a social good because it addresses the needs 
of the poor and elevates the working class within an economic and social 
system.  Joseph Schumpeter recognized Marx’s dialectic.  However, where 
Marx finds the transition from feudalism to socialism good because it frees 
the worker from an oppressive, unjust market system, Schumpeter laments 
the transition, and it is the proletariat’s rebellion against the efficiencies of 
the market system that is mis-understood. Marx and Schumpeter were both 
scholars of the market system, and it appears we no longer have high 
profile scholars studying the intricacies of markets. However, Alan 
Greenspan—former chair of the US Federal Reserve System—is a long-time 
policy advocate, who has made his career studying markets and extolling 
their benefits.  While not an academic publishing numerous papers on the 
benefits of a market system, Greenspan is a pre-eminent policy maker who 
appreciates and understands the intricacies and benefits of a market 
system, with deep appreciation of the institution with the knowledge that 
resembles Marx and Schumpeter.  It is against this backdrop that Alan 
Greenspan and Adrian Wooldridge have written an historical account of 
US market development in Capitalism in America: A History. 
Where Adam Smith is the father of modern economics, Schumpeter is 
the father of economic dynamism and innovation.  Joseph Schumpeter was 
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an early 20th century polymath who specialized in industrial and growth 
economics (Schumpeter, 1942; McGraw, 2007). His lasting contribution to 
economics is the now staple “creative destruction,” where new innovations 
or technologies displace previous production methods, which displace 
previous modes of economic production. The engine of innovation is the 
entrepreneur, the agent who fosters new ideas and brings new products, 
processes, and artistic works to market that exploit profitable trading 
opportunities to create new markets. Because these innovators are 
frequently not the same as individuals who accumulate excess funds, 
behind most entrepreneurs is the entrepreneurial financier, or the agent left 
to evaluate which new products should be brought to market, who finances 
successful entrepreneurial ideas with seed capital until budding ideas 
blossom into fully functioning products (Bodenhorn, 1999).  Students of 
capitalism, Greenspan and Wooldridge emphasize creative destruction’s 
role in market processes and invoke it throughout American economic 
history.   
The American founders saw the importance of innovation and built it 
into early American founding documents.  However, when new products 
are brought to market, existing traders and unsuspecting speculators are 
unable to accurately price such innovations, which leads to irrational 
exuberance. These are periods when new product’s actual prices exceed 
unknown intrinsic values, or that period when bubbles are more likely.  At 
the other end of the innovative cycle is the period of decline, when mature 
economies lose their vigor, and as Alvin Hanson predicted, economic 
growth declines in advanced economies because demographic and 
economic structures mature, which leads to secular stagnation.  In the 
history of economic thought, these three themes—creative destruction, 
irrational exuberance, and secular stagnation—are core economic theories 
that Greenspan and Wooldridge use to weave dynamic periods in US 
economic growth, such as the second half of the 19th century with spurts of 
rapid economic growth, accompanied by periods of financial crisis. 
The early economic history chapters are loosely organized into market 
dynamism in technology, industry, factor markets, and institutions, such as 
legal arrangements and organizational structure. Traditional economic 
history emphasizes the 18th through 19th century’s Agricultural, Industrial, 
and Transportation Revolutions, and US economic history is partitioned 
into these research clusters. Greenspan and Woodridge weave together a 
well-written, informed narrative about how market forces and the 
dynamism of creative destruction are cornerstones of US market 
development. 
Alfred Chandler’s 1976 Pulitzer Prize winning book Managerial 
Capitalism emphasizes the history and role of firm structure in US economic 
development. Characteristics of the modern firm are the separation of 
ownership from management, the development of specialized units within 
firms that perform specific tasks, and efforts to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Reflecting Chandler’s insights, Greenspan and 
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Wooldridge use the device of institutional evolution to reflect how the 
modern firm evolved simultaneously with US economic history. Where 
new products and markets developed, budding firms were essential with 
entrepreneurial efforts. Astor had the Northwest Company. Vanderbilt had 
the Accessory Transit Company (Stiles, 2007). Rockefeller had Standard Oil 
(Chernow, 1998). Carnegie had US Steel (Nasaw, 2007).  Ford had his Motor 
Company. Contemporary entrepreneurs of Gates, Jobs, and Bezos have 
Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon. So, throughout US economic development, 
it is difficult to separate iconic entrepreneurs from their iconic companies. 
Much of contemporary economic history emphasizes more traditional 
areas, like agricultural and transportation revolutions, frequently to the 
detriment of a more eloquent narrative. However, Greenspan and 
Wooldridge weave the rise of the modern firm into economic history, 
creative destruction, and the dynamism of market forces. 
In a surprise but natural diversion from their tale of markets in US 
economic history, Greenspan and Wooldridge address policy makers and 
periods they believe took American economic history down the wrong 
paths, away from capitalism and market efficiency. During the Great 
Depression, output decreased and unemployment rolls swelled. National 
and International calls for socialism followed. In the United States, 
segments of the population doubted capitalism’s ability to deliver 
economic benefits associated with a modern industrial economy.  Ten years 
prior to the onset of the Great Depression, a depression subdued US 
agriculture, which led to agricultural displacement. Rex Tugwell and 
Franklin Roosevelt went so far as to model the US agricultural system on 
the former Soviet Union’s agricultural sector’s five year plans (Schlaes, 
2008; Kennedy, 1999). Lyndon Baines Johnson went further to expand the 
social safety net and save individuals from the fear created by markets and 
creative destruction. However, Greenspan and Wooldridge take issue with 
Roosevelt and Johnson’s revolutions in that they interfered with markets 
and prevented creative destruction. Later in their evaluation of markets 
and challenges that markets face, Greenspan and Wooldridge boldly 
contrast the dilemmas created by unfunded entitlement programs created 
by Roosevelt and Johnson. As larger fiscal deficits and labor market 
disincentives distort real economic activity, social entitlements and 
unfunded liabilities threaten creative destruction, which is a profound 
indictment on two previous presidents from Alan Greenspan, one of the 
most influential economic thinkers and policy advocates in modern times. 
Nevertheless, from 1987 through 2006, as US Federal Reserve Chair, 
Greenspan’s free-market record is not unblemished. There are competing 
views on the causes of America’s 2008-2010 Great Recession, but the 
underlying facts are mostly agreeable. A host of institutional factors failed 
in the early 2000s.  To prevent the US from sliding into a recession after the 
dot-com bust, the Federal Reserve kept interest rates inordinately low in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Security and Exchange Commission 
failed to regulate securities markets. Private sector credit rating agencies 
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failed to appropriately rate collateralized mortgages associated with the 
housing market.  The Federal Reserve kept key interest rates too low for too 
long. Bank regulators—captured by bankers—failed to exercise appropriate 
oversight over derivatives markets and mortgage lending (Johnson, 2010). 
Brooksley Born and Shiela Baird warned of credit risks associated with the 
US banking sector’s use of derivatives and over reliance of unfettered 
financial markets. Greenspan stood idly by, and his faith in unfettered 
markets with his overwhelming stature as Federal Reserve chair drowned 
out legitimate decent that may have curbed speculation with the 2008 US 
housing market collapse. Before 2008 and the early financial crisis, 
Greenspan maintained his faith in free-market liberalism and his belief that 
markets were self-regulatory, that markets were sufficiently efficient and 
transparent that large-scale financial market disruptions were not possible.  
Nonetheless, the 2008-2010 financial crisis occurred, markets did not see 
through perverse financial market participant’s actions. Alan Greenspan—
with his unfettered belief in unfettered markets—did not recognize or 
prepare the US economy as Federal Reserve chair against the largest 
financial market disruption since the Great Depression. He was not alone.  
During much of his Federal Reserve administration, Greenspan was known 
for overly accommodative monetary policy—the Greenspan put—where 
the Fed was fast to accommodate financial market participants with bond 
purchases that favored large financial institutions. Moreover, while 
Capitalism in America addresses an abundance of not-fully identified 
potential causal explanations for the 2008 financial crisis, it does not 
seriously consider the role that the US Federal Reserve had in the crisis, 
which is a significant omission in a US economic history book. The 
omission and de-emphasis of the Federal Reserve’s potential roll in 2008’s 
financial crisis is sobering and mistaken. 
Where do we go from here?  Greenspan and Wooldridge consider the 
role of declining favorable US demographics and market orientation.  
Entitlements are considerable threats to the future vitality of US economic 
progress.  Deficit spending looms large as obstacles for future US economic 
vitality. Nonetheless, across developed economies, the US demographic 
structure remains favorable, entitlements—while a real threat—remain 
manageable, and a large US debt has to be put in context of negative real 
interest rates, which indicates world financial markets favor more US debt 
as opposed to less. 
It does not matter what one thinks of Alan Greenspan’s role in the 2008 
World economic crisis.  Capitalism in America is a well-written, clear minded 
history of markets in US history. Although a policy economist, like Marx 
and Schumpeter, Alan Greenspan is a student of capitalism. Greenspan and 
Wooldridge’s broad application of economic principles enlightens our 
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